Data verified as of November 11, 2026. Primary sources: the National Police Board of Finland, the Finnish Government, the Finnish Tax Administration, the Veikkaus Annual Report, iGB, Next.io, and iGaming Finland. Forecasts and commercial scenarios represent editorial analysis.

Finland is preparing to abandon its monopoly over online casinos and sports betting. The first licenses have already been issued, international operators are gearing up to launch, and the state is promising a more transparent and tightly controlled market. Yet the reform comes with a paradox: new entrants must spend millions to enter a GEO where their chief competitor has spent decades building an audience, while their promotional options will be tightly constrained. Who, in the end, will profit from Finnish liberalization?

Eight months remain before Finland's online gambling market opens, but the race for players is already under way. According to the National Police Board of Finland, as of October 29, 2026, 18 licenses have been issued and another 63 applications are under review. Until July 1, 2027, however, no new licensee will be able to legally launch gambling or its promotion on the Finnish market.

For the international iGaming industry, this is a rare chance to enter a mature European market that long sat under the control of the state operator Veikkaus. Yet the Finnish reform is no invitation to free competition. The state is opening a commercially attractive segment while simultaneously restricting marketing, imposing product requirements, and preserving part of the former monopolist's exclusive rights.

Prospective rivals to Veikkaus find themselves in an unusual position: money must be spent on the market now, yet the economics of player acquisition can only be tested after launch. Holding a license still does not mean an operator will be free to use the growth tools customary in iGaming.

The opening of Finland's online gambling market creates opportunities for international operators, but it does not guarantee them a level playing field against Veikkaus, which already has a recognizable brand and a client base built over many years. On 3S.INFO, we take a close look at how advertising restrictions, the unavailability of familiar affiliate marketing, and launch costs will shape the economics for new licensees, and why infrastructure providers may start earning before the casinos themselves do. The central question of the reform is whether players can be shifted from offshore into the regulated segment without reducing competition to a contest among a few of the largest budgets.

The Veikkaus Monopoly Lost Not to Competitors but to Reality

For a long time, the Finnish system was built around a state monopoly. Veikkaus controlled legal gambling in mainland Finland, and the model itself was justified by the need to protect players, prevent addiction, and fund socially significant causes.

The problem was that the monopoly effectively limited the number of legal operators but could not fully control user behavior. Finnish players kept using foreign online casinos and bookmaking platforms operating outside the national licensing system.

The scale of the problem is plainly visible in Veikkaus's own reporting. According to the company's 2024 annual report, the total Finnish online gambling market was estimated at roughly €1.13 billion in GGR, of which more than €550 million went to foreign operators. The state company thus controlled about half of the digital market, despite its formal monopoly.

By the time of the reform, then, Finland already had a competitive online market. Only a substantial part of it was operating outside Finnish licensing.

Channelization therefore becomes the state's central task: shifting players and money flows out of the offshore segment toward operators that pay local taxes and comply with national requirements. This differs fundamentally from classic liberalization, whose primary aim is to develop competition.

Finland is not so much trying to create new demand as to bring existing demand back under control. And here the first conflict emerges: for players to migrate voluntarily to licensed platforms, those platforms must be competitive in product, payments, and user experience. But strict requirements on advertising and operations may leave the regulated segment less flexible than the offshore one.

The outcome of the reform will depend not on the number of licenses issued but on how attractive the legal market proves to players who are already used to alternatives.

  • Another regulation story. New Zealand chose to regulate online casinos through an auction: the right to enter the market must first be won at a tender and only then confirmed by proving you can meet licensing requirements. The final license price was NZ$15 million (around US$8.4 million). For the state, this is a way to cap the number of operators and tighten control; for business, an expensive entry ticket that still does not guarantee permission to operate. But the bigger question is different: can a market of at most 15 casinos compete with the hundreds of offshore platforms New Zealanders already use?

Licenses Are Issued in Advance, but the Competition Is Already Unequal

Applications for Finnish licenses opened on March 1, 2026. By October 26, the regulator had received 79 applications and approved 12. Three days later, the number of approved licenses had risen to 18, and the total volume of applications had reached 81. The regulator now estimates a review period of six to eight months.

At first glance, the picture looks optimistic: operators are actively entering the new GEO, and the regulator is gradually assembling the list of participants. But 18 licenses by no means signify 18 independent competitors.

According to Next.io, six permits are tied to ComeOn Group, and three each to Nordplay Group and Blixx Gaming. The list also includes Wildz Group through Granturo Finland, SkillOnNet, Superbet through Sunflower Gaming, Hippos ATG, and SuomiVeto. All 18 permits are distributed among nine operator groups.

It is the structure of the applicants that shows the market is drawing not only new local ventures but also groups with existing infrastructure, experience in regulated jurisdictions, and the ability to spread costs across several brands.

For a small independent operator, a launch like this is far riskier. Under the official terms, merely reviewing a single license application in 2026 costs €29,000, and the fee is non-refundable if the application is rejected. On top of that comes legal support, documentation, technical preparation, payment infrastructure, and localization.

Obtaining a license also does not grant the right to begin commercial activity before July 2027. As a result, a company may already be carrying the costs of a team and infrastructure while still unable to earn revenue from Finnish players.

The less time remains before the market opens, the more expensive uncertainty becomes. Early licensees gain an advantage in product preparation, negotiations with suppliers, and campaign planning. Companies approved just before launch, or later, risk entering a GEO where the first advertising budgets have already been allocated.

This does not necessarily mean the early entrants will win. They are simply the first to shoulder the reform's financial risk.

Veikkaus Loses Its Monopoly but Keeps the Most Valuable Thing: Its Audience

The chief beneficiary of the reform may well be the very company whose monopoly the whole exercise was meant to curb.

As of July 1, 2027, Veikkaus will lose its exclusive rights to online casino and sports betting. Yet the state company will retain a monopoly position in certain other segments, including lotteries, scratch cards, and some land-based gambling.

Veikkaus already has what it would take newcomers years to build: a recognizable brand, an existing customer base, a history of engagement with players, and domestic infrastructure.

At the end of 2024, the company reported roughly 2.6 million registered customers. That is not the same as the number of active online casino users and does not allow a direct estimate of future market share, but it demonstrates the scale of the head start well.

An international operator must explain to a Finnish user who it is, why it can be trusted, and why it is worth opening a new account. Veikkaus needs no introduction to much of the audience.

Here it is important to distinguish between two types of players. A user who already plays on offshore platforms is potentially open to alternative brands. But a customer accustomed to Veikkaus may see no reason whatsoever to change operators. If the existing product suits them, the arrival of a licensed competitor does not in itself create any motivation to switch.

That is precisely why Veikkaus does not necessarily have to win the war for new players. It only needs to retain a substantial share of the old ones.

International competitors face a different task. They will have to bring the audience back from offshore and prove that their offering deserves attention alongside the state brand. That demands heavy spending on recognition and trust, especially in a country where the usual performance channels will be restricted.

That said, treating a Veikkaus victory as a foregone conclusion would be premature too. International operators have experience managing competitive products, CRM, slot portfolios, and sports markets. If their offering proves more convenient and diverse, some players may favor the new brands. But given the marketing requirements, converting product advantages into market share will be harder than in more open jurisdictions.

The New Market's Biggest Shortage Isn't Licenses — It's Advertising Channels

Marketing restrictions are likely to prove the most contentious element of the Finnish reform.

In most competitive iGaming jurisdictions, an operator can test a GEO relatively quickly: launch performance campaigns, strike deals with affiliates, assess CPA, analyze deposits and LTV. If the economics add up, budgets go up. If not, the company trims spending or shifts strategy.

In Finland, that model will be considerably harder.

The new Gambling Act permits advertising on television, radio, in print, and through a licensed operator's own channels, subject to established restrictions. Influencer marketing and telephone direct marketing are prohibited. Affiliate promotion paid per acquired player is likewise treated as a banned practice.

The market thus opens to new operators, yet some of the most familiar audience-acquisition tools become unavailable.

For a large international brand, that is an unwelcome but manageable constraint. It can afford a television campaign, a sponsorship contract, or long-term investment in recognition. A small operator used to buying traffic through CPA and RevShare partnerships loses the ability to scale as early results come in.

In Finland, the size of the marketing budget may matter more than the efficiency of its use.

This is a fundamental shift in the competitive environment. The performance model lets a relatively small brand compete with a large operator on the strength of traffic quality, conversion, and product. When access to such channels is restricted, the advantage passes to companies able to finance a large-scale market presence well before sustainable revenue appears.

An additional effect is the rising commercial value of permitted advertising inventory. If dozens of operators all want access to sports sponsorships, television slots, and major media at once, competition for a limited supply of quality placements may drive prices up.

But here an awkward question arises for the state. If the reform's goal is to shift players from offshore into the licensed sector, how effective is it to restrict precisely the channels through which that audience has grown accustomed to finding operators?

Finland is trying to achieve two outcomes at once: to grow the regulated market's share and to prevent the aggressive commercialization of gambling. Both intentions are understandable, but their compatibility remains to be tested.

For the affiliate industry, Finland looks like a particularly contradictory GEO.

On one hand, the opening of a large regulated market usually generates demand for comparison sites, casino reviews, SEO content, and local media. Operators need new users, and affiliates get the chance to monetize commercial queries.

On the other, the Finnish model effectively shuts down familiar affiliate marketing as a means of player acquisition.

This is not merely a restriction on a specific advertising mechanic. What falls under the ban is the very commercial logic by which an independent site is paid for a player it refers. And it hardly matters here whether CPA, RevShare, or another payment form is used: if the affiliate placement is aimed at promoting gambling, it creates regulatory risk.

Even before the reform, the Finnish police treated paid affiliate links placed in gambling streams and on other platforms as an example of illegal gambling marketing.

That said, it is important not to conflate commercial affiliate sites with independent information resources. Editorial material on regulation, the industry, and operators is not necessarily advertising. But reviews, rankings, and links backed by an economic interest in acquiring players require a separate legal assessment.

The result is an unusual situation: new operators will need traffic, yet one of the main industries specializing in supplying it will be unable to work under the familiar rules.

For affiliates, this means Finland cannot be automatically added to the list of promising GEOs simply because licensing is starting there. The commercial potential of an audience and the ability to monetize it legally are two different metrics.

Perhaps some SEO teams will pivot toward informational media, B2B content, and advertising models that are not tied to promoting gambling. But that is a different business with different economics. The familiar scheme, in which a small team launches a Finnish casino comparison site and sells FTDs to licensed operators, does not become lawful simply because the market has opened.

The 22% Tax: Why Profits May Fall Short of Expectations

The Finnish Tax Administration confirms that, as of July 1, 2027, the licensed gambling segment will be subject to a 22% tax on the gambling margin — in essence, the difference between stakes taken and winnings paid out, within the applicable definition of the tax base.

The rate itself does not look extreme by European standards. But it has to be weighed alongside marketing restrictions, the cost of compliance, and potential competition for players.

Picture an operator entering Finland and reaching €10 million in annual GGR. For illustration, let us take the following cost model.

Article
Conditional Annual Figure
GGR€10 million
Gambling tax, 22%−€2.2 million
Providers, payments, and variable costs−€1.5 million
Marketing−€3 million
Local operations and compliance−€1.2 million
Remainder before other costs€2.1 million

An illustrative scenario, not a forecast for the Finnish market. The expense figures, apart from the established tax rate, are assumptions. All possible taxes, fees, group overheads, and initial investments are not taken into account.

In such a scenario, the operator is left with €2.1 million before additional costs. But if player acquisition costs come in higher than assumed, and brand recognition has to be built from scratch, the financial result can deteriorate quickly.

The risk of inefficient marketing budget allocation is especially interesting. In a performance model, an operator quickly sees how much it costs to acquire a depositor and how much revenue that depositor brings. In brand marketing, the link between spending and results is far less direct. A television campaign may boost recognition, but pinning down exactly how many additional players it brought is harder.

Finland's reform therefore creates not only a high cost of entry but also an elevated risk of misjudging future CAC, the cost of customer acquisition.

For large operators, the first loss-making quarters may be part of a planned investment strategy. For smaller companies, a comparable result may put their continued presence in the GEO in doubt.

Over a few years, this could lead to a situation where the number of active licenses shrinks noticeably relative to the initial interest in the market. Not necessarily through revocation: some operators may simply pull back from active promotion or revise their plans.

Then the formally open market will begin to consolidate around a handful of large participants.

The Finnish Player Has Already Found a Casino. Why Switch to a Licensed One?

One more factor may prove more important than marketing budgets.

A significant share of the Finnish online audience already uses foreign operators. These players are familiar with the existing products, payment methods, and game selection. The licensed market's task, therefore, is not merely to attract new customers but to change entrenched habits.

For a player, a new national license can be an added argument for trust. Local oversight, clear dispute-resolution rules, self-limitation tools, and requirements on the operator all raise the user's level of protection.

But trust is not the only factor in the choice. Ease of registration, payment speed, the sportsbook offering, game mechanics, and service quality all matter. If the licensed platform falls short of the offshore product in user experience, part of the audience may stick with the familiar brands.

Not every offshore player is necessarily looking for an alternative. And not everyone is ready to switch operators just so that one pays taxes in Finland.

This makes channelization the reform's key commercial metric. It is not enough for the state to issue a few dozen licenses and gain new taxpayers. It must ensure that players genuinely move their activity into the regulated sector.

That said, a high channelization rate will not necessarily mean growth in the overall gambling market. In the state's ideal scenario, a substantial share of existing turnover simply shifts from one regulatory category into another. Additional growth in demand is a separate outcome that cannot be taken for granted or treated as automatically desirable from a responsible gambling standpoint.

Who Will Get Paid Before the Operators?

While international brands prepare to battle for future deposits, some participants in the ecosystem are already drawing commercial opportunities from the reform.

To launch in a regulated jurisdiction, an operator must build out its technical and legal infrastructure. Here a services market emerges that depends very little on which particular brand ultimately claims leadership.

Legal advisers guide operators through licensing and the interpretation of requirements. Compliance providers help set up KYC, AML, player-behavior monitoring, and responsible gambling. Payment companies prepare solutions for local operations. Platform vendors adapt their products to the new legislation.

Additional demand will also arise from the separate licensing of gambling software. Under the official schedule, applications for such permits will open in July 2027, and the corresponding requirements for suppliers will come into force on July 1, 2028.

The economics here differ considerably from the operator side. A technology provider can serve several licensees at once without shouldering the full risk of acquiring the end player.

For example, if ten operators enter the market simultaneously, they may all need similar solutions for user verification, transaction monitoring, and regulatory reporting. Even if half of those brands scale back within a few years, much of the initial integration and preparation work will already have been paid for.

Of course, B2B providers also bear adaptation costs and face competition. But an infrastructure vendor sells readiness to enter the market, while an operator buys the chance to earn in it someday.

This makes payment, compliance, and platform companies among the most intriguing commercial participants in the Finnish reform.

Three Scenarios: Who Will Win the Finnish Market by 2029?

The first results of the reform will be assessable as early as 2027, but the real test of business models will begin later, once the initial advertising campaigns wind down, player-retention data comes in, and operators face the need to recoup their initial investments.

We see three most likely scenarios.

Scenario 1. Veikkaus Retains the Lead While International Groups Divide the Rest of the Market

This looks like the most probable outcome at the early stage. Veikkaus leverages the advantage of an existing customer base and brand recognition, while large international operators compete for users of offshore platforms and for those players willing to try new products.

New brands may gain a noticeable share in certain segments, but restricted marketing channels will make a rapid reallocation of the audience difficult.

In that case, the Finnish reform will increase the number of legal participants without producing a radical shift in the balance of power.

Scenario 2. International Operators Capture a Substantial Share of the Online Segment

This variant is possible if the new licensees' products prove more appealing than Veikkaus's offering, and players begin moving actively toward international brands.

Especially important will be the operators' ability to carry their experience from other European GEOs into the Finnish market without breaching local marketing rules and responsible gambling requirements.

Such competition, however, will demand substantial investment. The likely leaders will not necessarily be the companies with the best product, but those able to deliver a strong product, broad recognition, and sustainable economics at the same time.

Scenario 3. High Costs Lead to Consolidation

The most interesting scenario for investors is that the initial enthusiasm gives way to disappointment among some participants.

Suppose a few dozen brands enter the fight for a limited audience at once, invest heavily in advertising and sponsorship, yet run into higher CAC and a longer payback period than they anticipated.

Some smaller operators cut budgets, others look for partners, and large groups consider buying customer bases, brands, or individual assets.

The Finnish market remains legally competitive but in practice concentrates around a small number of companies.

The scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Veikkaus may retain the lead in the first year, international brands may strengthen their position in the second, and by 2029 the market may already have passed through its first wave of consolidation.

What Would Show That the Reform Is Actually Working?

Judging Finnish liberalization solely by the number of licenses issued would be a mistake. The most telling results will emerge from other statistics.

  1. First, it is necessary to track what share of digital GGR moves under national licenses. That will reveal whether Finland is genuinely bringing offshore turnover back into the regulated sector.
  2. Second, it matters to see how many of the licensed companies actually launch products and keep investing in the market after the first quarters. The list of licensees and the list of sustainably working operators may turn out to be substantially different.
  3. The third indicator is the distribution of market shares. If, in two or three years, Veikkaus and a few international groups control the overwhelming majority of the licensed segment, a question will arise as to how far the new model has actually improved the competitive environment.

Finally, the regulator will have to assess not only tax receipts but also the consequences for players. Growth in legal turnover should not automatically be counted as a success if it comes with an increase in problem gambling.

Finland Is Selling Access to the Market but Not Guaranteeing a Place in It

The Finnish reform is interesting above all because it reveals a new logic in European gambling regulation. The state is no longer trying to shut private online operators out of the national market entirely. Instead, it sets the rules under which they may compete and determines the price of such access.

Yet a vast distance remains between permission to compete and equal starting conditions.

Veikkaus already has an audience. International operators have capital, product, and experience. Small brands have potential flexibility but far less room to experiment with user acquisition. Affiliates, who in many other markets help new players compete with incumbents, are effectively excluded from the standard traffic-distribution model in Finland.

Against this backdrop, the most predictable commercial opportunities arise for those who sell licensing, technology, infrastructure, and permitted advertising inventory.

Our forecast: by 2029, Finland is more likely to end up with a market of a few strong operators than with dozens of competitors of comparable scale. Veikkaus has a good chance of retaining a substantial share, but the battle for the digital audience will hinge on product quality and on whether new brands can weather a long payback period.

At the same time, the central question for the regulator remains open: will the legal segment prove attractive enough to lure players back from offshore without turning gambling marketing into an unchecked arms race of budgets?

On July 1, 2027, Finland will open its market to competition. But the winners will be decided not by the day licenses are issued, but by the economics of the years that follow.

And perhaps the most expensive participants in the reform will not be those who paid for a license, but those who paid for players they could never retain.